

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

4.1 Conclusion

Based on abovementioned conceptual frameworks, data, and analysis, the reason behind Nauru government's decision to recognize the ROC over the PRC in 2005 politically is to avoid any possible conflict in the future. As a small state, it is normal for Nauru to accentuate conflict-avoiding strategy in any occasions, especially in choosing an ally or cooperation. To implement that strategy, small states prefer a non-competitive relationship and seek to maintain good relations¹⁹⁵ rather than a repressive relationship. The researcher is aware, that inter-state conflict often occurs in certain parts of the world where complex interdependence does not influence.¹⁹⁶ While, on the other hand, complex interdependence itself prevails¹⁹⁷ because of the cobinding of liberal democracies in a complex web of rules that gives each member security from external violence without having to give up independence and sovereignty.¹⁹⁸

The researcher argues that Nauru government's decision was relevant to the conflict-avoiding strategy of a small state. It is proven by the fact that there is no tangible conflict between Nauru and the ROC during their diplomatic relations from

¹⁹⁵ Kajnc & Syetlicic, op, cit

¹⁹⁶ Keohane & Nye, 1998, op, cit

¹⁹⁷ Isiksal, op, cit

¹⁹⁸ Thorhallsson & Steinsson, op, cit

1980 to 2002 and 2005. Comparatively, conflict does occur in Nauru-PRC diplomatic relations in 2002-2005. The researcher notices that, there are physical altercations between the PRC and Nauru, especially altercations of the PRC's officials against the President of Nauru in 2005. However, the conflict between Nauru and the PRC during the diplomatic cooperation in 2002-2005 does not exclusive to physical altercation only, but also covers wider area such as strategic manipulations. The first manipulation of the PRC to Nauru is when the PRC promised to grant a huge amount of aid to Nauru in 2002. But, until 2005, the PRC had failed to materialize its promises to Nauru on the promised scale.¹⁹⁹ Secondly, in 2005, the PRC's officials attempted to divert the President of Nauru from Taipei to Beijing by presenting a ticket to Beijing and offered red carpet treatment.²⁰⁰ Consequently, after analyzing the provided data, its clear that Nauru-ROC relations has a lesser conflict, if any, compared to Nauru-PRC. Hence, this fact justified Nauru government's policy to recognize the ROC over the PRC in 2005 politically.

Nevertheless, the ROC and Nauru, indeed, are small states. Therefore, their cooperation would be insignificant to prevent an upcoming threat from the PRC. Though, the researcher analyzed that, there are emerging connections between Australia and the U.S. to Nauru. As explained in the previous chapter, Australia is the warrantor of Nauru security so that Nauru doesn't have to fund or establish a military institution. Other than that, through the establishment of Pacific Regional Assistance

¹⁹⁹ Crocombe, op, cit

²⁰⁰ Ibid

for Nauru (PRAN), National Sustainable Strategy (NSDS) for Nauru, Police Development Program (PDP), Pacific Solution scheme, and the Australian aid program for Nauru, Australia has become Nauru largest aid donor.²⁰¹ On the other hand, since the security of Nauru is guaranteed by Australia, the U.S. contributed through the largest source of funding of Nauru after the phosphate mining, that is the fisheries. For example, the U.S. lured economic advantages to Nauru through an Economic Assistance Agreement, Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI), regional Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), and so on. The emerging connection between Australia and the U.S. to Nauru has proven the trade-off which justified Nauru government's policy to recognize the ROC over the PRC in 2005 politically.

4.2 Suggestion

In this research, the researcher acknowledged that there are some flaws, especially in data collection. Therefore, the researcher suggests that in the next research, the researcher must utilize the primary data as the main data and secondary data as supporting data. However, when the primary data is not viable, the researcher must be able to guarantee that secondary data availability is enough to support the claim. Other than that, in this research, the research findings are limited to the claim that the relations between the ROC and Nauru are more likely to create stability and expand the zone of peace compared to the relations between the PRC and Nauru. There must be further comparative research regarding the same topic in the future,

²⁰¹ Gordon, op, cit

especially the states' behavior to cope with the cooperation challenges. Moreover, since the research scope is exclusive in 1999-2005 only, further research for the post-2005 period to assess the validity of the research claim must be conducted.